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1The description of ni˙svabhåvatå and its intentional meaning:




At the beginning of the first chapter of the uttarapak≈a of the Madhyamakåloka (hereafter
MÅ), Kamalaßîla says that he follows Dharmakîrti's position on scriptural authority. As his way
of determining the reliability or authority of scriptures, Kamalaßîla adopts the threefold
investigation explained in the Dharmakîrti's Pramåñavårttika (hereafter PV) I k. 215 and called
“threefold analysis” (dpyad pa gsum / dpyad gsum) in the Tibetan Buddhism.1 It is said in the
MÅ:
[Therefore,] since statements ascertained as faultless by means of three kinds of
investigations (tshul gsum gyi brtag pas) and as excellent for the first [stage of practice,
i.e., hearing (ßruti)], the last [stage, i.e., meditation (bhåvanå)], and the middle [stage, i.e.,
consideration (cintå)], are non-belying (avisaµvåda), scholars should rely upon such
[statements].2
Dharmakîrti's threefold investigation called tshul gsum gyi brtag pa by Kamalaßîla before
Tibetan Buddhists called it dpyad pa gsum is as follows:
(1) A scripture's or treatise's accounts of perceptible states of affairs (aparok≈a) are not refuted
by direct perception (pratyak≈a).
(2) Its accounts of imperceptible states of affairs (parok≈a) are not refuted by any inference
which functions by the force of entities (vastubalaprav®ttånumåna).
1 For Kamalaßîla's adopting Dharmakîrti's position on scriptural authority and his three kinds of investigations,
see KEIRA (2006).
PV I k. 215: pratyak≈enånumånena dvividhåpy abådhanam / d®≈†åd®≈†årthayor asyåvisaµvådas tadarthayo˙ // 
“A [treatise's] being non-belying [means that] there is no invalidation of its two [kinds of] propositions
concerning empirical and unempirical things by direct perception or by the two sorts of inferences [viz., inference
which functions by the force of entities (vastubalaprav®ttånumåna) and inference based upon scripture
(ågamåßritånumåna)].” See TILLEMANS (1999) p. 28, 3-9.
2 MÅ D148b4-5: [de'i phyir] bka' gang zhig tshul gsum gyi brtag pas yongs su dag pa thog ma dang tha ma dang
bar du dge bar nges pa de ni mi slu ba'i phyir de mkhas pa rnams kyis brten par bya ba nyid do //. See MAV
D83a2-3 and MAP D133b1-2.
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2(3) The scripture's or treatise’s statements concerning radically inaccessible states of affairs
(atyantaparok≈a) are not directly or indirectly contradicted by other statements in the
scripture or in the treatise, i.e., by another scripturally based inference (ågamåßritånumåna).3
According to Dharmakîrti, a scripture or treatise will be reliable or authoritative for the
inference of radically inaccessible (atyantaparok≈a) objects, such as heavens (svarga) and hells,
if it passes the above-explained threefold investigation. The selflessness (nairåtmya) or absence
of intrinsic nature (ni˙svabhåvatå) of dharmas is regarded as an imperceptible (parok≈a) object
which is objectively inferable, and therefore when one wants to quote a scripture's description
concerning the absence of intrinsic nature, the second investigation (2) of the above-explained
threefold investigation serves as the criterion for judging whether he can accept that description
or not; it is required that that description is not refuted by any vastubalaprav®ttånumåna, i.e.,
objectively functioning inference. For Kamalaßîla, that description must not be contradicted
with the absence of ultimately existing intrinsic nature which is regarded as the ultimate
(paramårtha) or reality (tattva) and is established by the vastubalaprav®ttånumånas stating five
reasons, such as “diamond-splinters” (vajrakaña), dependent origination (pratîtyasamutpåda)
and being neither one nor many (ekånekaviyoga).4
Kamalaßîla accepts not only Dharmakîrti's idea of the two sorts of inferences, i.e.,
vastubalaprav®ttånumåna and ågamåßritånumåna, but also his position on scriptural authority.
Moreover we have already clarified elsewhere that Kamalaßîla relied upon and expanded
Dharmakîrti's theory of nonperception (anupalabdhi) when he proves or establishes the
Mådhyamika position of the absence of real intrinsic nature of all dharmas by means of valid
cognition (pramåña).5 Due to these facts, we can understand that Dharmakîrti's theory of valid
cognition serves as his grounds for proving or establishing the Mådhyamika position of the
absence of real intrinsic nature.6
Now, after stating that he follows Dharmakîrti's position on scriptural authority, Kamalaßîla,
in the MÅ, undertakes the Mådhyamika interpretations of the definitive meaning (nîtårtha),
interpretative meaning (neyårtha), three natures (trisvabhåva), three kinds of no-natures
(trividhå ni˙svabhåvatå), idea of mind only (cittamåtra) and so forth. Offering those
3 See TILLEMANS (2000) pp. 78-79. On the investigation by ågamåßritånumåna, see PV IV k. 107:
virodhodbhåvanapråyå parîk≈åpy atra tadyathå / adharmamülaµ rågådi snånaµ cådharmaßodhanam //. English
translation in TILLEMANS ibid. p. 150, 7-12: “In the case of this [treatise], examination, moreover, consists
chiefly in pointing out contradictions [between prior and subsequent propositions and is not concerned with facts
(våstavî )]. For example, [contradictions such as when it is said that] desire, etc. are the root of immorality and
that bathing is what purifies immorality.”
4 For Kamalaßîla's five reasons for proving the absence of ultimately existing intrinsic nature imagined by others,
see KEIRA (2004) p. 10, fn. 32. For the logico-grammatical structure of the thesis of ni˙svabhåvatå, see KEIRA
ibid., pp. 30-38.
5 KEIRA ibid. pp. 47-86 and p. 86, fn. 131.
6 See KEIRA (2006) pp. 184-185.
3Mådhyamika interpretations, he seems to undertake to make the Yogåcåra philosophy and the
Mådhyamika philosophy compatible. This, however, does not mean that the former should be
on an equal footing with the latter. This is just a Mådhyamika philosophical approach to the
Yogåcåra philosophy for the purpose of showing that the Mådhaymika philosophy is superior
to the Yogåcåra philosophy. This philosophical approach, however, makes it possible for
Kamalaßîla to solve the doctrinal conflict between the Mådhaymika and the Yogåcåra and to
link the Yogåcåra philosophy to the Mådhaymika philosophy which he holds to be the highest
of the Buddhist philosophies. From another point of view, Kamalaßîla establishes a soteriology
for leading the followers of Yogåcåra philosophy to the Mådhaymika philosophy, viz., the
Mådhyamika wisdom of truth (tattvajˆåna).7 Kamalaßîla's method for establishing this type of
philosophical compatibility seems to be that he solves the problem of the doctrinal
incompatibility between these two schools by offering those Mådhyamika interpretations which
he made taking Dharmakîrti's theory of valid cognition and Kamalaßîla's vastubalaprav®ttånu-
månas as the reasons for those interpretations. Therefore, we should clarify the details of
7 Adopting the teaching of the one vehicle (ekayåna) which is the essentials of his soteriology, Kamalaßîla holds
that everyone has the Buddha nature (tathågatagarbha) and can attain the stage of the supreme and perfect
enlightenment (anuttarasamyaksaµbodhi). In order to attain that stage, however, one has to obtain the wisdom of
truth (tattvajnåna). Kamalaßîla regards the “vehicle” (yåna) of the word “one vehicle” (ekayåna) as the means of
attaining nirvåña, i.e., the wisdom which directly understands the truth consisting in the selflessness (nairåtmya)
of all dharmas. Therefore, the Mådhyamika wisdom of truth is the one and only vehicle which enables one to
attain nirvåña. See MÅ D242b4-243a3: sems can thams cad ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po (tathågatagarbha)
can no zhes bya ba 'dis kyang / thams cad bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub (anuttara-
samyaksaµbodhi) kyi go 'phang thob par rung ba nyid du yongs su bstan te / ... // de skad du bstan pas ni thams
cad bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyi rang bzhin nyid du yongs su bstan pa yin no // gzhan
yang theg pa (yåna) zhes bya ba ni mya ngan las 'das pa'i grong khyer (nirvåñapura: the city of nirvåña) du 'gro
ba'i lam de kho na nyid shes pa'i bdag nyid la bya ste / 'di nas 'gro ba'i phyir ro // de kho na nyid shes pa kho nas
thar pa thob par 'gyur gyi / gzhan gyis ni ma yin no // de kho na nyid de yang gcig kho nar zad de / ... // de'i phyir
de kho na nyid ngo bo nyid gcig pa'i yul can gyi ye shes kyang ngo bo nyid gcig pa kho na yin no // ... // de lta bas
na chos dang gang zag la bdag med pa'i de kho na nyid mngon sum pa'i ye shes gang yin pa de nyid mya ngan las
'das pa thob par byed pa'i yang dag pa'i lam yin gyi / gzhan ni ma yin pa de'i phyir theg pa ni gcig kho nar zad
do //. Although Kamalaßîla holds that the followers of Yogåcåra philosophy and the Íråvakas all have the
Buddha nature, how can they obtain the Mådhyamika wisdom of truth in order to attain the stage of the supreme
and perfect enlightenment? It is well known that Kamalaßîla, quoting LAS X kk. 256-257, explains his idea of
the progress of meditation, i.e., gradualism. His idea of gradualism explains the process of obtaining the
Mådhyamika wisdom of truth. For an English translation of LAS X kk. 256-257, see KEIRA (2004) p. 75. For
Kamalaßîla's idea of gradualism, see KAJIYAMA (1978). According to his interpretation of LAS X kk. 256-257,
Kamalaßîla seems to see meditation as involving the following stages: (1) In reliance upon the Yogåcåra position
(i.e., Satyåkåravåda), yogins transcend the Vaibhå≈ika and Sautråntika positions that external objects are really
existent; (2) Taking the Alîkåkåravåda, i.e., the position that the aspects (åkåra) of cognition are deceptive and do
not ultimately exist, yogins abide in the nondual cognition (advayajˆåna) and transcend the Satyåkåravåda, i.e,
the position that the aspects of cognition are really existent; (3) Eliminating the attachment to the real existence of
the nondual cognition, yogins abide in the Mådhyamika meditation and see the Mahåyåna, i.e., the ultimate
reality (paramatattva). This idea of Kamalaßîla shows that by accepting and following his idea of gradualism, the
Yogåcåra yogins and the Íråvaka yogins, i.e., the Vaibhå≈ika and Sautråntika yogins, can abide in the
Mådhyamika meditation and obtain the Mådhyamika wisdom of truth, with the result that they also will attain
the stage of the supreme and perfect enlightenment. Therefore, Kamalaßîla's idea of gradualism can also be
regarded as a soteriology for leading the followers of Yogåcåra philosophy and the Íråvakas to the Mådhyamika
wisdom of truth.
4Kamalaßîla's method of solving the problem of the doctrinal incompatibility and elucidate the
structure and meaning of the philosophical compatibility which Kamalaßîla intends to establish.
Otherwise, we will not completely understand the essential characteristics of his Mådhyamika
philosophy.
In this article, we focus on the Yogåcåra objection that one should understand the teaching
of the absence of intrinsic nature (ni˙svabhåvatå) according to an interpretative meaning
(neyårtha), and that the Illustrious One (bhagavat) taught the ni˙svabhåvatå with the intention of
explaining the three kinds of no-natures. Kamalaßîla cannot accept that the ni˙svabhåvatå would
be a teaching to be understood according to an interpretative meaning because he holds that it is
a teaching to be understood according to the definitive meaning. Then how will Kamalaßîla
solve this doctrinal conflict? His solution is that the ni˙svabhåvatå taught with the intention
(abhipråya) of the three kinds of no-natures is also regarded as a teaching to be understood
according to the definitive meaning. In the MÅ he clearly states that it is possible that a teaching
with an intentional meaning (abhipråya) expresses the definitive meaning.8 In order to elucidate
the reasons of his solution, we, after analyzing the Yogåcåra objection mentioned above, will
analyze his interpretations of the definitive meaning (nîtårtha) and the three kinds of no-natures.
These analyses will allow us to say that these interpretations serve as the reasons for his solution
and that these interpretations are all based upon the theory of valid cognition.
2. Analysis of the Yogåcåra objection
In the MÅ the Yogåcåra opponent makes the following objection:
In a certain scripture [i.e., Saµdhinirmocanasütra], it is said:
All dharmas are without intrinsic nature, unarisen, calm from the beginning, and
completely extinguished by nature ... and so forth.
That [description] also should be understood according to an interpretative meaning
(neyårtha). This is because the teachings by the Illustrious One are effectuated with
various intentions. In that [description the Illustrious One] says that all dharmas are
without intrinsic nature, with the intention of [explaining] that the three natures, i.e.,
imagined [nature], dependent [nature] and thoroughly established [nature], are void of
[their] natures concerning characters, arising and the ultimate, respectively. Therefore,
due to being without intrinsic nature, [all dharmas] are unarisen. Due to being [unarisen],
8 See MÅ D151b4: de'i phyir dgongs pa bstan pa yang nges pa'i don nyid du 'gal bar mi byed do //. See p. 19.
5they are calm from the beginning. Due to being [calm from the beginning], they are
completely extinguished by nature. In this manner the Illustrious One himself, in the
Årya Saµdhinirmocana and other [scriptures], explained the application of the intention
of the [real] meaning of the scriptural [description teaching the absence of intrinsic
nature].9
Following the descriptions of the Saµdhinirmocanasütra (hereafter SNS), the Yogåcåras
say that the ni˙svabhåvatå taught in the Prajˆåpåramitåsütras and explained by the
Mådhyamikas should be understood according to an interpretative meaning (neyårtha), and that
the Illustrious One teaches the ni˙svabhåvatå with the intention of explaining another meaning
(arthåntara),10 i.e., the three kinds of no-natures: (1) the absence of nature concerning characters
9 MÅ D134a2-5: mdo kha cig las chos thams cad ni ngo bo nyid med pa (D pa: P pa /) ma skyes pa gzod ma nas
zhi ba / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa'o zhes bya ba la sogs pa 'byung ba gang yin pa de yang
drang ba'i don nyid du rtogs par bya ste / bcom (D bcom: P bcoms) ldan 'das kyi bstan pa ni dgongs pa sna tshogs
kyi sgo nas 'jug pa'i phyir ro // de la ngo bo nyid gsum po kun brtags pa dang / gzhan gyi dbang dang / yongs su
grub pa rnams ni go rim (P rim: D rims) bzhin du mtshan nyid dang / skye ba dang / (D /: P om.) don dam pa ngo
bo nyid med pa las dgongs nas chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du gsungs te / de bas na ngo bo nyid
med pa'i phyir ma skyes pa'o // de'i phyir gzod ma nas zhi ba'o // de'i phyir rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las
'das pa ste / de bzhin du bcom ldan 'das nyid (D nyid: P om.) kyis 'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa la sogs pa
las mdo'i don gyi dgongs pa sbyar ba bstan pa yin no //.
mdo kha cig las ... . See SNS p. 66, 24-26: chos thams cad ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa / chos thams cad ma
skyes pa / ma 'gags pa / gzod ma nas zhi ba / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa ... /. 『解深密経』
Taisho 16, 693c28-29: 世尊復説一切諸法皆無自性無生無滅本来寂静自性涅槃. See also NAGAO (1982)
pp. 383-388 and MATSUSHITA (1987b) pp. (63)-(64), n. 14 and n. 15.
For the teaching of the ni˙svabhåvatå which should be understood according to an interpretative meaning,
see SNS p. 75, 4-9: don dam yang dag 'phags 'di la de bzhin gshegs pa ni ngo bo nyid med pa nyid rnam pa gsum
po de dag nyid las dgongs nas drang ba'i don gyi mdo brjod pa'i rnam pas 'di lta ste / chos thams cad ngo bo nyid
med pa / chos thams cad ma skyes pa / ma 'gags pa / gzod ma nas zhi ba / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las
'das pa'o zhes chos ston to /. “Paramårthasamudgata! In the way that the scripture which [explains] an
interpretative meaning is described, Tathågata here, with the intention of those three kinds of no-natures, taught
that all dharmas were without intrinsic nature, unarisen, undestroyed, calm from the beginning, completely
extinguished by nature”
For the intention of explaining the three kinds of no-natures, see SNS p. 67, 26-30: don dam yang dag 'phags
ngas chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid rnam pa gsum po 'di lta ste / mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid
dang / skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid dang / don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid las dgongs nas chos thams
cad ngo bo nyid med pa'o zhes bstan to / . “Paramårthasamudgata! I taught that all dharmas were without
intrinsic nature, with the intention of the three kinds of no-natures of all dharmas, that is to say, the absence of
nature concerning characters, absence of nature concerning arising and absence of nature concerning the
ultimate.” See also AS p. 696, 8-12: (p. 84, 11-15 in Pradhan edition: p. 35, 15-18 in Gokhale edition:) yad uktaµ
vaipulye ni˙svabhåvå˙ sarvadharmå iti / tatra ko 'bhisandhi˙ / ... / api khalu parikalpite svabhåve lak≈aña- 
ni˙svabhåvatåm upådåya paratantre utpattini˙svabhåvatåm upådåya parini≈panne paramårthani˙svabhåvatåm 
upådåya //. And see ASBh p. 679, 9-17 (p. 114, 20-26 in Tatia edition).
de bas na ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir... . See MSA XI p. 68, 1-2: yo hi ni˙svabhåva˙ so 'nutpanno yo 
'nutpanna˙ so 'niruddho yo 'niruddha˙ sa ådißånto ya ådißånta˙ sa prak®tiparinirv®ta ... /. Cf. AS p. 698, 10-13: (p.
84, 16-19 in Pradhan edition: p. 35, 19-20 in Gokhale edition:) yathå ni˙svabhåvås tathå anutpannå˙ / yathå 
anutpannås tathå aniruddhå˙ / yathå anutpannåß cåniruddhåß ca tathå ådißåntå˙ / yathå ådißåntås tathå 
prak®tiparinirv®tå˙ //. See also MSA XI k. 51: (a Sanskrit reconstruction in LÉVI (1911) p. 122, 32-33:)
ni˙svabhåvatayå siddhå uttarottaranißrayåt / anutpannåniruddhådißåntaprak®tinirv®tå˙ //.
10 For the four kinds of intentions, i.e., intention of evenness (samatåbhipråya), intention of another meaning
6(lak≈añani˙svabhåvatå), which is established with respect to the imagined nature (parikalpita-
svabhåva), (2) the absence of nature concerning arising (utpattini˙svabhåvatå), which is
established with respect to the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhåva) and (3) the absence of
nature concerning the ultimate (paramårthani˙svabhåvatå), which is established with respect to
the thoroughly established nature (parini≈pannasvabhåva).11
Now, here, we need to mention the Yogåcåra ideas of nîtårtha and neyårtha in order to
understand extensively the Yogåcåra objection quoted above. It is already reported that most
of the Yogåcåra refutations appearing in the MÅ can be held to be based upon Vasubandhu's
ideas explained in his Vyåkhyåyukti (hereafter VY),12 and that in his VY Vasubandhu holds
(arthåntaråbhipråya), intention of different times (kålåntaråbhipråya) and intention of the tendency of the
individual (pudgalåßayåbhipråya), see MSA XII k. 18: samatårthåntare jˆeyas tathå kålåntare puna˙ / 
pudgalasyåßaye caiva abhipråyaß caturvidha˙ //.
For the intention of another meaning, see MSA XII p. 83, 2-3 (= ASBh p. 699, 7-9 (p. 115, 4-6 in Tatia
edition)): arthåntaråbhipråyo yad åha / ni˙svabhåvå˙ sarvadharmå anutpannå ityevamådi ayathårutårthatvåt /.
“The intention of another meaning [is shown] in statements such as when it is said: ‘all dharmas are without
intrinsic nature and unarisen,’ for [such a statement should be understood] according to an unliteral meaning.”
Arthåntaråbhipråya is regarded as the intention of explaining a meaning other than the literal meaning
(yathårutårtha).
11 The three kinds of no-natures are established on the basis of the three natures. Due to this, the Yogåcåras hold
that the teaching of the ni˙svabhåvatå also means the establishment of the three natures. According to Sthiramati,
the Illustrious One taught the absence of intrinsic nature (ngo bo nyid med pa) of all dharmas with the intention
of the imagined nature, their nonarising and noncessation (ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags pa) with the intention of
the dependent nature and their complete extinction in nature (rang bzhin gyis mya ngan las 'das pa) with the
intention of the thoroughly established nature. See SAVBh D242b3-5: don gzhan gyi lden po ngag ni mdo dag
las chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa dang ma skyes pa dang / ma 'gags pa dang / rang bzhin gyis mya ngan las
'das pa'o zhes gsungs pa yang thams cad nas thams cad du med pa'i don du lta ba ma yin gyi kun brtags kyi rang
bzhin la dgongs nas chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med par bshad / gzhan dbang la dgongs nas ni ma skyes pa dang
ma 'gags pa zhes bshad / yongs su grub pa la dgongs nas ni chos thams cad rang bzhin gyis mya ngan las 'das
pa'o zhes bshad do //. Note that this idea of Sthiramati can be regarded as explaining the hidden or profound
meaning concerning characters (lak≈añåbhisaµdhi) which is one of the four kinds of profound meanings:
avatåråbhisaµdhi, lak≈añåbhisaµdhi, pratipak≈åbhisaµdhi and pariñåmanåbhisaµdhi. See MSA p. 82, 16-17 (=
ASBh p. 701, 5-6 (p. 115, 14-15 in Tatia edition)): lak≈añåbhisaµdhis tri≈u parikalpitådisvabhåve≈u dra≈†avyo*
ni˙svabhåvånutpannådisarvadharmadeßanåt ... [*dra≈†avya˙ in ASBh]. “The profound meaning concerning
characters should be understood with reference to three natures such as imagined [nature], due to the teaching
that all dharmas are without intrinsic nature and unarisen and so forth.” See NAGAO (1982) p. 397, n. 3. For the
four kinds of profound meanings, see MSA XII kk. 16-17 and p. 82, 13-25 and ASBh p. 2-20 (p. 115, 12-25 in
Tatia edition).
Sthiramati says that when the Illustrious One teaches in the Prajˆåpåramitåsütra and other scriptures that all
things are nonexistent, one should not understand the teaching according to the literal meaning (yathårutårtha),
because the teaching means that the imagined nature is nonexistent. Sthiramati holds that although the imagined
nature is nonexistent, the dependent nature and thoroughly established nature are existent. See SAVBh D19a1-3:
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la sogs pa'i nang nas thams cad med par bshad pas sangs rgyas kyi tshig
(buddhavacana) ma yin no zhes sems pa la / sgra gzhan phyir (rutånyatvåt) zhes smras te / bcom ldan 'das kyis
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la sogs par med do zhes bshad pa de yang sgra ji bzhin gyi don ma yin te / ji ltar
byis pa rnams kyis gzung ba dang 'dzin par kun tu brtags pa'i rang bzhin med pa la dgongs nas med do zhes
gsungs ste / gzhan gyi dbang dang yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo ni med pa ma yin pa ste / ... //.
12 See MATSUSHITA (1987a)(1987b). In the fourth chapter of the VY, Vasubandhu quotes and examines
twenty-eight wrong views (a≈†åviµßatir asadd®≈†aya), such as view on signs (nimittad®≈†i), which are explained in
the theg pa chen po'i mdo dod pa chan po skye ba (or theg pa chen po la dod pa / dad pa cher 'bhung gi mdo), i.e.,
Årya Mahåyånaprasådaprabhåvanasütra or Mahådharmådarßa. In the MÅ Kamalaßîla also quotes and
7that the definitive meaning (nîtårtha) should be the literal meaning (yathårutårtha) and the
interpretative meaning (neyårtha) is not literally understood.13 This can be understood, for
example, in the following description in the fourth chapter of the VY:
I will examine whether these [teachings of the Mahåyåna should be understood]
according to an interpretative meaning (neyårtha) or according to the literal meaning
(yathårutårtha) ... .
Therefore, one should not determine [words such as ni˙svabhåvatå] according to the
literal meaning of these words. This is because [otherwise] these would be contradictory
with other scriptures. If you say: “How [should one determine these words]?” [we
reply that] one [should determine them] as having an intentional meaning (åbhipråyika).
Take the following for example: the verse saying: “Having killed his mother and father
(måtaraµ pitaraµ hatvå) ...” and the verse saying: “[The person who] is unbelieving and
ungrateful (aßraddho 'k®tajˆaß ca) ... .” Since the definitive meanings are not taught in
these verses, one should also not determine [the verses] according to their literal
meanings. This is because [otherwise] they would be contradictory with other scriptures.
If you say: “How [should one determine them]?” [we reply that] one [should
determine them] as having intentional meanings (åbhipråyika).14
examines this sütra's twenty-eight wrong views. See fn. 16. Moreover, Kamalaßîla quotes and examines most of
the scriptural descriptions which Vasubandhu quotes in the fourth chapter of the VY as the teachings to be
understood according to their definitive meanings (nîtårtha). Due to these facts, we can understand that in the MÅ
Kamalaßîla analyzes the Yogåcåra ideas explained in the fourth chapter of the VY.
For the name of the sütra, i.e., theg pa chen po'i mdo dod pa chan po skye ba (=Årya Mahåyånaprasådapra-
bhåvanasütra), see MATSUDA (1986).
13 See MATSUDA (1983), HONJO (1989) and LEE (2001) pp. 79-83.
14 VY D99b7-101a2: ci 'di bkri ba'i don nam / 'on te sgra ji bzhin gyi don yin zhes dpyad par bya ste / ... / de lta
bas na tshig de rnams kyi sgra ji bzhin gyi don du nges par gzung bar mi bya ste / mdo sde gzhan dang 'gal ba'i
phyir ro // 'o na ci zhe na / dgongs pa can yin no // dper na / pha dang ma ni bsad byad shing / zhes bya ba'i tshigs
su bcad pa 'di dang / ma dad byas pa mi shes dang // zhes bya ba'i tshigs su bcad pa 'di la nges pa'i don bshad pa
med par yang sgra ji bzhin gyi don du nges par gzung par mi bya ste / mdo sde gzhan dang 'gal ba'i phyir ro // 'o
na ci zhe na / dgongs pa can yin no //. See HONJO (1990) and MATSUDA (1983).
pha dang ma ni bsad byad shing / ... . This phrase is identified with Udånavarga XXIX-24a. The whole verse
is quoted in the VY D91a-b1. The Sanskrit text is found in the AS p. 940, 5-6: (p. 107, 1-2 in Pradhan edition:)
måtaraµ pitaraµ hatvå råjånaµ dvau bahußrutau / rå≈†raµ sånucaraµ hatvå naro vißuddha ucyate //. “It is said
that having killed his mother and father and the king and the two well-informed [Brahmans], and having
conquered the kingdom with its officials, the person will be pure.” This verse has a hidden meaning (abhisaµdhi).
For example, the stanza måtaraµ pitaraµ hatvå means “having destroyed his craving (t®≈ñå) and existence
consisting in karma (karmabhava).” That is, The mother is regarded as t®≈ñå, and the father is regarded as
karmabhava. See ASBh p. 941, 12-15 (p. 155, 14-17 in Tatia edition) and VY D97b5. In his Udånavargavivaraña,
Prajˆåvarman regards the mother as “ignorance” (avidyå) and the father as “conditioning factors” (saµskåra).
See HONJO ibid. p. 69, n. 4) and ROCKHILL (1975) pp. 210, 16-212, 17. There is also another interpretation that
the father is regarded as the idea of identity (nga'o snyam pa'i nga rgyal; asmimåna). See VY D97b5.
ma dad byas pa mi shes dang / ... . This phrase is identified with Udånavarga XXIX-23a. The Sanskrit text of
that verse is found in the AS p. 944, 3-4: (p. 107, 3-4 in Pradhan edition:) aßraddho 'k®tajˆaß ca sandhicchedî ca yo
nara˙ / hatåvakåßo våntaßa˙ sa vai uttamapuru≈a˙ //. “The person who is unbelieving, who is ungrateful, who
8Vasubandhu here says that what is not the interpretative meaning (neyårtha), i.e., the
definitive meaning (nîtårtha), should be understood as the literal meaning (yathårutårtha). On
the other hand, he says that what is not the definitive meaning, i.e., the interpretative meaning,
should not be understood as the literal meaning. That is to say, whether one should understand a
scripture's description according to the literal meaning (yathårutårtha) or according to an
unliteral meaning (ayathårutårtha) serves as the criterion for judging whether the description
explains the definitive meaning or an interpretative meaning. Just as in the case of the
Yogåcåra idea that the Illustrious One teaches the ni˙svabhåvatå with the intention of
explaining the three kinds of no-natures, the teaching with the intention (abhipråya) of
explaining a meaning other (arthåntara) than the literal meaning should be understood according
to an unliteral meaning, viz., according to an interpretative meaning (neyårtha).
The Yogåcåra objection quoted earlier means that the teaching of the ni˙svabhåvatå should
be understood not according to the literal meaning (yathårutåtha) but according to an unliteral
meaning (ayathårutårtha). Vasubandhu holds that when one understands that teaching according
to an unliteral meaning, i.e., as meaning the three kinds of no-natures established on the basis of
the three natures, one will understand the middle way consisting in the exclusion of the two
extremes which are superimposition (samåropa/åropa) and denial (apavåda).15 However, those
who understand that teaching according to the literal meaning will make philosophical or
doctrinal errors: They will have the twenty-eight wrong views explained in the
Mahåyånaprasådaprabhåvanasütra16 and deny both defilement (saµkleßa) and purification
(vyavadåna);17 They will also not understand the middle way.
steals by housebreaking, who destroys chances and who eats vomited things, is indeed an excellent man.” See
VY D101b1 and ASBh p. 945, 2-11 (p. 155, 23-30 in Tatia edition). This verse also has a hidden meaning. For
example, aßraddha means that the person does not accept the things which others say, because he knows them by
means of his own direct cognition (svapratyayatvåt). ak®tajˆa is regarded as the person who understands the
unconditioned complete extinction (asaµsk®tanirvåñajˆåna). See ASBh p. 945, 14-15 (p. 156, 2-3 in Tatia
edition). See also HONJO ibid. pp. 69-70, n. 19).
15 See VY D107a6-b2: chos thams cad ni ngo bo nyid med pa / ma skyes pa ma 'gags pa zhes bya ba de lta bu la
sogs pa 'di yang bshad par bya'o // ci'i phyir zhe na / byis pas kun du brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid yod pa nyid du 'dzin
pa bsal ba'i phyir ro // ranb bzhin gyis mig skyon can du gyur ba dag la kun tu brtags pa'i rang bzhin de yod pa
nyid du 'dzin pa bsal ba'i phyir de med pa nyid yin pa dang 'dra bar de sgra ji bzhin gyi don ma yin no zhes 'di
skad kyang gdon mi za bar bshad par bya'o // ci'i phyir zhe na / mgo smos pa mi shes pa rnams brjod du med pa'i
ngo bo'i chos med par 'dzin pa bsal ba'i phyir ro // de ltar na kha cig ni sgro 'dogs pa'i mtha' dang / kha cig ni skur
pa 'debs pa'i mtha' spangs pa yin no //.
16 For the VY's quotation of the Mahåyånaprasådaprabhåvanasütra's twenty-eight wrong views, see VY
D102a3-104b6. Cf. MÅ D144a7-145a1. Those twenty-eight wrong views are also quoted in the AS p. 688, 11-16
(p. 84, 5-10 in Pradhan edition: p. 35, 10-14 in Gokhale edition). For the explanation of those wrong views, see
ASBh pp. 689, 2- 695, 13 (pp. 112, 20-114, 13 in Tatia edition). For the name of this scripture, see fn. 12.
17 See VY D110a4-b1: yang theg pa chen po pa kha cig thams cad rang gi mtshan nyid du ni med pa kho na yin
la / kun rdzob tu ni bcom ldan 'das kyis chos rnams yod pa nyid du bstan to zhes sgra ji bzhin pa nyid kyi don yin
par brjod pa yang yin pa de dag la ji skad bstan pa'i brtsad pa 'di yang 'byung bar 'gyur ro // kun rdzob ces bya ba
yang brjod pa yin la / de yang kun nas nyon mongs pa dang mthun pa nyes par bshad pa zhes bya ba la / rnam par
9In the MÅ Kamalaßîla regards Vasubandhu's ideas as explained above as the Yogåcåra
objections against the Mådhyamika philosophy and replies to them. The Yogåcåras raise
various objections. However, the Yogåcåra idea that the ni˙svabhåvatå is a teaching to be
understood according to an interpretative meaning is the fundamental problem in this case
which causes the doctrinal conflict between the two schools. That is, the Mådhyamikas who
hold the ni˙svabhåvatå to be the ultimate truth (paramårtha) cannot accept this idea of the
Yogåcåra. This is because, for the Mådhyamikas, the meaning of that teaching is already clearly
established or determined (nîta) as the ultimate and because it is unacceptable for them that that
teaching should be interpreted (neya) in different manners.18
3. Kamalaßîla's interpretations of nîtårtha and neyårtha
Kamalaßîla undertakes new(?) interpretations of nîtårtha and neyårtha in order to establish
the idea that a teaching's intentional meaning (abhipråya) which is other than the literal meaning
(yathårutårtha) is not necessarily the neyårtha. This idea gives the Mådhyamikas occasion to
invalidate the Yogåcåra idea that an intentional meaning other than the literal meaning, viz.,
arthåntaråbhipråya, would necessarily be the neyårtha because that meaning is unliterally
understood. It is said in the MÅ:
① It is also not correct to say: “The Illustrious One's statements which show the
[absence of intrinsic nature can] not be found at all.” That is, the Illustrious One said that
one [should] rely upon the scripture [explaining] the definitive meaning, and did not [say
that one should rely upon the scripture explaining] an interpretative meaning. If you say:
“What is the definitive meaning?” [we reply that] it is established by means of valid
cognition and is explained with reference to the ultimate, for it is impossible that the
[meaning] would lead us to any other [state] than the [ultimate]. Now, the nonarising of
all dharmas is established by means of valid cognition. Therefore, due to [its] being
byang ba dang mthun pa ni legs par bshad pa zhes bya ba yin no zhe na / brjod pa tsam du zad na ji ltar na legs
par bshad pa'am / nyes par bshad par 'gyur / kun rdzob kyang kha cig gdon mi za bar dngos su khas blang bar bya
bar 'gyur ro // yang na de yang med na ni ji ltar kun rdzob tu yod pa nyid du gsungs pa yin / kun nas nyon mongs
pa dang / rnam par byang ba thams cad la skur pa btab pas gnas dang gnas ma yin pa gnyis la mi gnas pa'i phyir
dang / rang gis rang smra ba bkag pa'i phyir brjod du med par 'gyur ro // dgongs pa can yin par smra ba na ni nyes
pa 'di dag tu mi 'gyur ro //.
18 For Candrakîrti's idea that Någårjuna's Madhyamakaßåstra was composed to show the distinction between
nîtårthasütras and neyåthasütras, see PrasP pp. 40-41: yata evaµ nirodhådaya˙ pratîtyasamutpådasyopa- 
labhyante / ata evedaµ madhyamakaßåstraµ prañîtam åcåryeña neyanîtårthasütråntavibhågopadarßanårthaµ /.
See also MA VI k. 97d: stong nyid don can nges don shes par gyis /. Differently from Candrakîrti, Bhåviveka
did not seem to examine the problem of nîtårtha, neyårtha and abhipråya extensively. See EJIMA (1980) p. 139, n.
(25). In the MÅ Kamalaßîla clearly says that the absence of intrinsic nature is a teaching to be understood
according to the definitive meaning.
10
established by means of reasoning, it is termed: “ultimate.”19
② It should be understood that just the statement about the ultimate expresses the
definitive meaning, and [the statement about] the opposite [of the ultimate] expresses an
interpretative meaning.20
According to his interpretations of nîtårtha and neyårtha, the definitive meaning expresses
the ultimate truth consisting in the absence of intrinsic nature, or nonarising of all dharmas
which the Mådhyamikas determined by means of valid cognition, i.e., the vastubalapra-
v®ttånumånas stating the five reasons. On the other hand, the interpretative meaning expresses
the convention (saµv®ti) which is the opposite of the ultimate.
Here, it should be noticed that in those interpretations of Kamalaßîla, he does not adopt the
Yogåcåra idea that the definitive meaning should be the literal meaning (yathårutårtha) and the
interpretative meaning expresses an unliteral meaning (ayathårutårtha) although Kamalaßîla and
the Yogåcåras seem to have the same idea that the intentional meaning (abhipråya) is unliterally
understood.21 This means that the idea of the intentional meaning that should be unliterally
understood is separated from the ideas of definitive meaning and interpretative meaning.
Therefore, Kamalaßîla can say that the unliteral and intentional meaning of a teaching is not
necessarily the neyårtha, and that when its unliteral and intentional meaning expresses the
ultimate, that meaning can be the nîtårtha.
Moreover, it should also be noticed that Kamalaßîla holds that valid cognitions, i.e., in this
context, his vastubalaprav®ttånumånas stating the five reasons, serve as the reason for judging
19 MÅ D148b6-149a1: de ston par byed pa'i bcom ldan 'das kyi bka' med pa nyid do (D do: P do //) zhes brjod
par yang rigs pa ma yin te / 'di ltar bcom ldan 'das kyis nges pa'i don gyi mdo la brten par gsungs kyi / drang ba'i
don la ni ma yin no // nges pa'i don kyang gang la bya zhe na / tshad ma dang bcas pa dang / don dam pa'i dbang
du mdzad nas bshad pa gang yin pa ste de ni de las logs shig gzhan gang du yang drang bar mi nus pa'i phyir ro //
chos thams cad mi skye ba yang tshad mas yang dag par grub ste / de nyid kyi phyir de ni rigs pa dang ldan pa
nyid kyis don dam pa zhes bya'o //.
nges pa'i don gyi mdo la brten par gsungs ... . See AKBh p. 465, 16-17: nîtårthaµ ca sütraµ pratisarañam ... /.
See also SA p. 704, 21-22: nîtårthasütraµ pratisarañaµ na neyårtham.
See MÅ D233a7-b1: skye ba med pa la sogs pa yang dag pa'i tshad mas kun tu gtan la phab cing sgro ma
btags pa gang yin pa de ni don dam pa'i bden pa zhes bya'o //. “It is said that the ultimate truth is the nonarising
and so forth which are determined by means of genuinely valid cognition and are not superimposed.”
20 MÅ D149b4-5: don dam pa brjod pa kho na nges pa'i don yin la / bzlog pa ni drang ba'i don yin no zhes bya
bar khong du chud par bya'o //.
21 See, for example, MÅ D151a6: yang de lta bas na ngas mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid las dgongs nas
chos thams cad ma skyes pa'o (D pa'o: P pa'o //) zhes bshad do zhes gsungs pa gang yin pa der yang sgra ji bzhin
gyi don du yongs su rtog pa de sel bar yang mdzad la / ... . For an English translation, see p. 17. See also MÅ
D151b3-4: de'i phyir skye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa nges pa'i don yin no // de ni don dam pa la dgongs nas
bstan pa'i phyir mthong ba la sogs pa dang 'gal ba yang ma yin la / sgra ji bzhin du yongs su rtog pa yang ma yin
no // de'i phyir dgongs pa bstan pa yang nges pa'i don nyid du 'gal bar mi byed do //. For an English translation,
see p.19. Note that abhipråya here should be regarded as arthåntaråbhipråya, i.e., the intention of a meaning other
than the literal meaning. See fn. 10.
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whether the meaning of a scripture's description is the nîtårtha or not. That is, one can determine
the meaning of the following description as the nîtårtha: the description explaining the ultimate
consisting in the ni˙svabhåvatå established by means of the vastubalaprav®ttånumånas stating
the five reasons, i.e., the “diamond-splinters” reason and other four reasons. One can rely upon
such a description. However, the meaning of the following description is not the nîtårtha: the
description of which the meaning is contradictory with the thing established by means of the
vastubalaprav®ttånumånas. Such a description is not reliable. Therefore, it seems clear that
Kamalaßîla's way of judging whether the meaning of a scripture's description is the nîtårtha or
not is based upon Dharmakîrti's idea of the second investigation (2) of the above-explained
threefold investigation for determining scriptural authority.22 And precisely this can be held to
be Kamalaßîla's reason for not following the Yogåcåra idea that the definitive meaning should
be the literal meaning and the interpretative meaning expresses an unliteral meaning.
Now, when the determination of the meaning of a scripture's description is not established,
one cannot judge whether or not its meaning is contradictory with the thing established by
means of the vastubalaprav®ttånumånas. The determination of its meaning is indispensable for
judging that. However, when its meaning is determined, it will not necessarily be the literal
meaning. That is, when one should understand a scripture's description according to an unliteral
meaning, then, understanding its intended unliteral meaning, one should judge whether the
meaning is not contradictory with the thing established by means of the vastubalaprav®ttånu-
månas. In this case just its intended unliteral meaning is the description's actual meaning which
one should examine to judge whether it is contradictory or not. Therefore, the examination of
whether the meaning should be understood literally or unliterally cannot be held to serve as the
criterion for judging whether the meaning is contradictory with the vastubalaprav®ttånumånas
or not, i.e., for judging whether the meaning expresses the nîtårtha or not.
The above will be supported by Dharmakîrti's theory of inference. That is, when one
determines the reliability of a scripture's statement about the ni˙svabhåvatå by means of
vastubalaprav®ttånumåna, what the statement asserts should be treated as the proposition to be
proved, i.e., the statement of the thesis (pak≈avacana). This is because in the Buddhist
epistemology verbal knowledge (ßåbda) is not a different pramåña from inference and is
regarded as a case of inference.23 When the statement's assertion is treated as the statement of
the thesis, this thesis-statement should follow Dharmakîrti's idea of the defining characteristic of
22 See pp. 1-2.
23 See PS V, k. 1: na pramåñåntaraµ ßåbdam anumånåt tathå hi tat / k®takatvådivat svårtham anyåpohena
bhå≈ate //. (This verse is quoted in the TSP p. 441, 6-7.) English translation in HATTORI (2000) p. 139, 4-10:
“That [means of cognition] which is based on word is not an [independent] means of cognition other than
inference. Because it [viz., a word] expresses its own object through the exclusion of the other [things], just as
[the inferential mark (li©ga)] ‘k®takatva’ (producedness) or the like [establishes the object to be proved through
the exclusion of what is not a possessor of that inferential mark].”
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the thesis (pak≈alak≈aña). Dharmakîrti says: “[A valid thesis] is one which is intended (i≈†a) by
[the proponent] himself (svayam) as something to be stated (nirdeßya) in its proper form alone
(svarüpeñaiva) [i.e., as something to be proved (sådhya)]” (svarüpeñaiva nirdeßya˙ svayam 
i≈†o).24 Commenting on this defining characteristic of the thesis, he says in the PV IV kk. 28-29
that by means of the word i≈†a (intended), one understands that the thesis is stated according to
the [real] sense (arthokta), and that even though not explicitly stated, what is pervaded (vyåpta)
by the proponent's intention (icchå) is held to be the sådhya, i.e., the actual thesis.25 He also says
in the PV IV k. 16 that the thesis-statement is a means of valid cognition (pramåña) for
revealing the speaker's intention (abhipråya).26 Therefore, the proposition intended by the
proponent is the actual thesis even though it is not explicitly stated. For example, the Såµkhya,
in order to prove the existence of the Spirit (puru≈a), states the following proposition: “The eyes
and other [faculties] are for the benefit of another (parårtha).” However, what the Såµkhya
actually intends by the word parårtha, but does not say, is the following proposition: “The eyes
and other [faculties, i.e., the derivatives of the Primordial Matter (prak®ti),] are for the use of the
Self (åtman) [i.e., the Spirit (puru≈a)].” This intended proposition should be examined as the
Såµkhya's actual thesis.27 Therefore, when the Såµkhya's proposition should not literally be
understood, even then, understanding the Såµkhya's intended proposition, one should judge
whether the intended proposition is true or not. Therefore, whether the Såµkhya's proposition
should be understood literally or unliterally does not serve as the criterion for judging whether
their proposition is true or not.
Thus, it can be held that Dharmakîrti's interpretation of the thesis made it possible for
24 English translation follows TILLEMANS (2000) p. 4, 21-24.
25 PV IV, kk. 28-29: gamyårthatve 'pi sådhyokter asaµmohåya lak≈añam / tac caturlak≈añaµ rüpa-
nipåte≈†asvayaµpadai˙ // asiddhåsådhanårthoktavådyabhyupagatagraha˙ / anukto 'pîcchayå vyåpta˙ sådhya 
åtmårthavan mata˙ //. English translation in TILLEMANS ibid. p. 48, 8-19: “Although the statement of what is to
be proved (sådhya = pak≈a) is something which can be understood [by implication], the [defining] characteristic
[of the thesis] was [stated] to dispel confusion. This [sådhya]] has four characteristics: By means of the words
‘proper form’ (rüpa), ‘alone’ (nipåta ‘particle’ = eva), ‘intended’ (i≈†a) and ‘himself’ (svayam), one understands
that [the thesis] is unestablished [for the opponent], is not a sådhana, is stated according to the [real] sense and is
what is accepted by the proponent (vådin). Even though not [explicitly] stated, what is pervaded by the
[proponent's] intention is held to be the sådhya, as in [the Såµkhya’s argument that the eyes, etc. are] for the
benefit of the Self (åtman).”
See also PV IV k. 31cd: anuktåv api våˆchåyå bhavet prakarañåd gati˙ //. English translation in TILLEMANS
ibid. p. 52, 7-9: “Although the intention might not be [explicitly] stated, it would be understood from the context
of the discussion (prakaraña).”
26 PV IV k. 16: tat pak≈avacanaµ vaktur abhipråyanivedane / pramåñaµ saµßayotpattes tata˙ såk≈ån na 
sådhanam //. English translation in TILLEMANS ibid. p. 27, 6-9: “So the thesis-statement is a means of valid
cognition (pramåña) for revealing the speaker's intention. [But] as doubt arises from it [as to whether the thesis is
true or not], it is not directly (såk≈åt) a means of proof (sådhana).”
27 See TILLEMANS ibid. p. 50, 7-15 and fn. 177. See also NB III-47: yathå parårthåß cak≈urådaya˙ saµghåtatvåc 
chayanåsanådya©gavad iti / atråtmårthå ity anuktåv apy åtmårthatå sådhyå / tena noktamåtram eva sådhyam ---
ity uktaµ bhavati //. And see NB p. 180, 15: tadvad atra pramåñe yad apy åtmårthåß cak≈urådaya ity
åtmårthatå noktå anuktåv apy åtmårthatå sådhyå /.
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Kamalaßîla to hold that the examination of whether a description's meaning should be
understood literally or unliterally did not serve as the criterion for judging whether it was the
nîtårtha or not. When one should understand the description according to an unliteral meaning,
its intended unliteral meaning should be regarded as the actual meaning and be examined in
order to judge whether it is the nîtårtha or not. Therefore, its intended unliteral meaning is not
necessarily the neyårtha.
4. Kamalaßîla's interpretation of the three kinds of no-natures
After explaining his own interpretations of nîtårtha and neyårtha, Kamalaßîla clearly states
in the MÅ that the Mådhyamikas also accept the establishment of the three natures and three
kinds of no-natures. He says:
[Objection:] If that were to be so [i.e., if the nîtårtha were to be regarded as expressing
the ultimate truth consisting in the nonarising], then how would the Illustrious One teach
in the Årya Saµdhinirmodcana that all dharmas are without intrinsic nature, with the
intention of [explaining] the three kinds of no-natures [which are established on the basis
of] the three natures?
[Reply:] This is not a fault. Those who make a denial of the conventional natures, whose
minds became confused from the attachment to [things] such as the hearing of untrue
treatises, who superimpose the permanent and [impermanent natures of] entities upon
the completely deceptive things which do not exist [even] conventionally and who
incorrectly grasp things like visible matter just as they appear, cannot enter an ocean of
the very profound ultimate doctrine which is free of the two extremes, due to their minds
having fallen into the two extremes of superimposition and denial. Therefore, for this
reason, the Illustrious One showed the middle way free of the two extremes by stating
the idea of nonarising and so forth just from the ultimate (paramårtha) point of view and
by showing his intention of [explaining] the three kinds of no-natures. Therefore, [the
Illustrious One] established the doctrine that [the Prajˆåpåramitåsütras' and other
scriptures' statements about the nonarising express] just the definitive meaning. The
Mådhyamikas also do accept the establishment of the three natures. Otherwise, how
could they avoid the [fallacy of] being contradictory with empirical [objects]
(d®≈†avirodha)?28
28 MÅ D149b6-150a4: gal te de lta yin na / 'o na ji ltar bcom ldan 'das kyis 'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa
las / ngo bo nyid gsum po ngo bo nyid med pa rnam pa (D pa: P om.) gsum las dgongs nas chos thams cad ngo
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Although Kamalaßîla says that the Mådhyamikas accept the three natures and three kinds of
no-natures, it is impossible for the Mådhyamikas to accept the genuine Yogåcåra ideas
concerning them. Kamalaßîla interprets them as being compatible with the Mådhyamika
philosophy. In the subsequent three items, we will analyze his interpretation of the three kinds
of no-natures, i.e., the absence of nature concerning arising (utpattini˙svabhåvatå), the absence
of nature concerning characters (lak≈añani˙svabhåvatå) and the absence of nature concerning
the ultimate (paramårthani˙svabhåvatå). Our analysis will clarify Kamalaßîla's idea that when
one should understand the teaching of the ni˙svabhåvatå according to an intended unliteral
meaning, i.e., as meaning the three kinds of no-natures, the teaching's intended meaning
(abhipråya) can also be the nîtårtha, because that intended meaning also expresses the ultimate.
a. Utpattini˙svabhåvatå
Kamalaßîla's interpretations of paratantrasvabhåva and utpattini˙svabhåvatå are as follows:
Of the [three natures], the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhåva) is the entity (dngos po)
which is acceptable only when any analytical investigation is not conducted, which is
bo nyid med par bstan zhe (D zhe: P ce) na / 'di ni nyes ba med de / gang dag kun rdzob pa'i ngo bo nyid la yang
skur pa 'debs par byed pa dang / dam pa ma yin pa'i bstan bcos mnyan pa la sogs pa la mngon par zhen pas blo
gros phyin ci log tu gyur pa gang dag kun rdzob tu yod pa ma yin pa brdzun pa kho na la yang rtag pa la sogs pa'i
dngos por sgro 'dogs shing (D shing: P shing /) gzugs la sogs pa ji ltar snang ba yang ji lta ba de bzhin du yongs
su 'dzin par 'gyur ba de dag sgro 'dogs pa dang skur pa 'debs pa'i mtha' gnyis su lhung ba'i blos don dam pa'i tshul
gyi rgya mtsho mtha' gnyis dang bral ba shin tu zab mo la mi 'jug pas de'i don du bcom ldan 'das kyis skye ba
med pa la sogs pa bstan pa don dam pa'i dbang du mdzad pa kho nar brjod cing ngo bo nyid med pa rnam pa
gsum gyi dgongs pa bstan pas dbu ma'i lam mtha' gnyis dang bral ba rab tu bstan pa'i phyir nges pa'i don kho na
gzhung 'dzugs par mdzad pa yin no // dbu ma pa rnams kyang ngo bo nyid gsum rnam par gzhag (D gzhag: P
bzhag) pa khas mi len pa ni ma yin te / gzhan du na mthong ba la sogs pa dang 'gal ba ji ltar spongs par 'gyur /.
For the opponent's objection, see SNS p. 67, 26-30. See fn. 9. See also Triµßikå k. 23: trividhasya
svabhåvasya trividhåµ ni˙svabhåvatåµ / saµdhåya sarvadharmåñåµ deßitå ni˙svabhåvatå //.
Almost parallel sentences are found in Abhayåkaragupta's MMA D138b1-4, P166b6-167a4: gang rnams kun
rdzob pa'i rang bzhin la yang (D yang: P 'ang) skur pa 'debs par byed pa dang / gang dam pa ma (P dam pa ma: D
dam pa) yin pa'i bstan bcos nyan pa la sogs pa la mngon par zhen pas blo gros phyin ci log can rnams / kun rdzob
yod pa ma yin pa brdzun pa kho na la rtag pa la sogs pa'i dngos por sgra 'dogs shing gzugs la sogs pa ji ltar snang
ba yang (D yang: P 'ang) ji lta ba de ltar* yongs su 'dzin par byed pa de rnams sgro 'dogs pa dang skur pa 'debs
pa'i mthar lhung ba'i blos mtha' gnyis dang bral ba'o (D ba'o: P ba'o //) zhes ji lta ba bzhin du don dam pa'i tshul
gyi (D gyi: P gyis) rgya mtsho shin tu zab mo la mi 'jug pas de'i don du bcom ldan 'das kyis dgongs pa nges par
'grel pa'i mdor** skye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa don dam pa'i dbang du byas pa nyid kho nar gsal par mdzad
cing ngo bo nyid med par (D par: P pa rnam pa) rnam pa gsum gyi dgongs pa bstan pas dbu ma'i lam mtha' gnyis
dang bral ba*** nges pa'i don kho nar gzhung 'dzugs par mdzad do //. (*The word bden par is inserted in the P
edition as a comment (mchan) on the term ji lta ba de ltar. ** MMA adds dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdor.
*** MMA omits rab tu bstan pa'i phyir.)
ngo bo nyid med par rnam pa gsum gyi ... . This sentence is quoted in the Lam rim. See NAGAO (1954) p.
166, 14-15.
nges pa'i don kho na gzhung 'dzugs par mdzad pa yin no. See BNJ 75b4: yum gyi mdo la sogs pa nges don
gyi mdo kho na yin pa'i gzhung 'dzugs par mdzad pa'i phyir /.
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just as it appears and which just like illusions, arises dependently. Just like illusions, the
[dependent nature] also arises conventionally by the force of other conditions, and does
not [arise from the thing] itself alone. Therefore, it is established as being without nature
concerning arising.29
This idea of the utpattini˙svabhåvatå, which Kamalaßîla explains on the level of the
conventional truth, is also found in the SNS and other texts.30 However, Kamalaßîla also gives
another interpretation of the utpattini˙svabhåvatå from the standpoint of the Mådhyamika
philosophy or on the level of the ultimate truth. That is, the Mådhyamikas hold that what is
produced depending upon its conditions is ultimately void of intrinsic nature, and therefore the
dependent nature is not an ultimately or really existing nature (yang dag pa'i ngo bo nyid). It is
not different from the illusions which do not arise ultimately. Therefore, it is established as
being without nature concerning arising.31 This interpretation of the utpattini˙svabhåvatå
29 MÅ D150a4-5: de la dngos po ma brtags na grags pa (D pa: P om.) ji ltar snang ba sgyu ma bzhin du brten nas
byung ba gang yin pa de ni gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yin no // de yang kun rdzob tu sgyu ma bzhin du
gzhan gyi rkyen gyi dbang gis skye'i / bdag nyid kho na ni ma yin pas skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rnam
par gzhag (D gzhag: P bzhag) ste /.
Almost parallel sentences are found in Abhayåkaragupta's MMA D138b4: de la gang ma brtags na yid ches
pa mthong ba ji lta ba sgyu ma bzhin du rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i dngos po de gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo
nyid do // de yang kun rdzob tu sgyu ma ltar pha rol rkyen gyi stobs kyis skye'i rang bzhin kho na ni ma yin pas
skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rnam par gzhag ste /.
Kamalaßîla's interpretations of paratantrasvabhåva means that the paratantrasvabhåva is the correct
convention (tathyasaµv®ti). See MAK 64: ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' zin // skye dang 'jig pa'i chos can pa //
don byed pa dag nus rnams kyi // rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs //. “One [should] understand that the [correct]
convention is [the entity] itself which is acceptable only when any analytical investigation is not conducted,
which possesses the properties of arising and cessation and which is the capacity for practical efficacy.” See
also MAV ad k. 64 D70b7-71a1: mthong ba dang 'dod pa'i dngos po rten cing 'brel par byung ba rnams ni brtag
mi bzod pas yang dag pa'i kun rdzob ste /. “The empirical and acceptable entities which arise dependently are the
correct convention, because they cannot endure analytical investigation.” Although the term don byed nus pa
(arthakriyåsåmarthya) does not appear in Kamalaßîla's interpretations of paratantrasvabhåva, his words dngos
po ... ji ltar snang ba can be regarded as meaning the entity as the capacity for practical efficacy
(arthakriyåsåmarthya) which is just as it appears. See SDVV ad k. 8abc D5b4: dngos po tsam gang yin pa de ni ji
ltar snang ba bzhin du don byed nus pa'i phyir ro //. See also SDVP D23b3: dngos po tsam nyid kyi gtan tshigs ni
don byed nus pa ste / 'di yang ji ltar snang ba bzhin du yin gyi / ... //. Jˆånagarbha says in his SDVK 8abc: brtags
pa'i don gyis dben gyur pa // dngos tsam brten nas gang skyes te // yang dag kun rdzob shes par bya //. “The
mere entity which is void of imagined things and arises dependently should be understood as the correct
convention.” He also says in the SDVV D5b4: rgyu dang rkyen rnams la brten nas skyes pa de ni yang dag pa'i
kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin par shes par bya ste /. Cf. MÅ D2305-6: gang yang rten cing 'brel par 'byung pa dang
rjes su mthun pa rab tu brtags pa / ... de ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob tu yod ces bya'o //. In his dBu ma snang ba'i
'grel pa (BNG), Phywa pa chos kyi seng ge says that the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhåva) is the false
convention (mithyåsaµv®ti) and the dependent nature is the correct convention. See BNG 22a1(307,1): kun
brtags pa log pa'i kun rdzob yin la gzhan dbang yang dag pa'i kun rdzob yin pas ... //.
30 See SNS p. 68, 11-13: de ni rkyen gzhan gyi stobs kyis byung ba yin gyi / bdag nyid kyis ni ma yin pas de'i
phyir skye ba ngo bo nid med pa nyid zhes bya'o /. See also ASBh p. 697, 10-13: (p. 114, 21-23 in Tatia edition:)
paratantrasya svayam utpattir nåsti pratyayåpek≈añåd ato nåsya svena bhåvena bhåva ity utpattini˙svabhåvatayå 
ni˙svabhåva˙ ... .
31 MÅ D150a5: mkhas pa rnams ni brten nas byung ba gang yin pa de rang bzhin gyis stong pa nyid do zhes bya
bar nges par 'dzin te ... //. MÅ D150b7-151a1: de'i phyir gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid ni yang dag pa'i ngo bo
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means that the dependent nature itself does not ultimately arise and is nonexistent on the level
of the ultimate truth.
b. Lak≈añani˙svabhåvatå
The parikalpitasvabhåva and lak≈añani˙svabhåvatå are interpreted as follows:
The imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhåva) is superimposed as an ultimate intrinsic
nature, such as permanent one and impermanent one, just upon the dependent nature
which is not different from illusions and so forth. The [imagined nature] is also
unestablished as [having] the characters as they are imagined, and therefore it is
established as being without nature concerning characters. This absence of nature is also
objectively (vastutas) established just with regard to the dependent nature. This is
because one imagines the same [dependent nature] as being characterized as the
[permanent ultimate nature and so forth].32
When one understands the teaching of the ni˙svabhåvatå according to its intentional
nyid du rigs pa ma yin te / de lta na ni sgyu ma la sogs pa yang dngos po nyid du thal bar 'gyur te / de dag kyang
rkyen la rag las par khyad par med pa'i phyir ro // de bas na gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid 'di sgyu ma dang
khyad par med pa nyid kyi phyir skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rnam par gzhag (D gzhag: P bzhag) go //.
“Therefore, it is not correct that the dependent nature [would be] a really [existing] nature. If it were to be so, it
would follow absurdly that illusions and so forth also would be real. This is because those also are not different
[from real entities] in depending upon their conditions. Therefore, dut to the fact that this dependent nature is not
different from illusions, it is established as being without nature concerning arising.”
In the BNG, Phywa pa chos kyi seng ge says that taking objection to the idea of Sthiramati, Kamalaßîla said:
“Therefore, it is not correct that the dependent nature [would be] a really [existing] nature.” See BNG
21a2(305,2): slob dpon blo brtan la rten 'brel gyi rtags las don dam pa'i dngos por dpog pa ma nges pa ni de'i
phyir zhes pa ste ... /. Sthiramati hold that although the imagined nature is nonexistent, the dependent nature and
thoroughly established nature are existent. See fn. 11.
32 MÅ D151a2-3: gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid sgyu ma la sogs pa dang khyad par med pa de nyid la rtag pa
dang mi rtag pa la sogs pa don dam pa pa'i rang gi ngo bor sgro 'dogs pa (D 'dogs pa: P 'dogs pa btags pa) gang
yin pa de ni kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid do // de yang ji ltar kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid du ma grub pa'i phyir
mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rnam par gzhag (D gzhag: P bzhag) go // ngo bo nyid med pa 'di yang
dngos su na gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid kho na la rnam par gzhag (D gzhag: P bzhag) ste / de nyid la de'i
mtshan nyid du nye bar brtags pa'i phyir ro //.
Almost parallel sentences are found in Abhayåkaragupta's MMA D138b5-7, P167a7-167b1: gzhan gyi
dbang gi ngo bo nyid [sgyu ma lta bu] de kho na la gang rtag pa dang mi rtag pa la sogs pa'i rang bzhin don dam
pa par [gang zag dang chos kyi bdag tu] sgro 'dogs pa de kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid do // [kun brtags] de 'ang (P
de 'ang: D de'i 'di) ji ltar kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid ma [don la] grub pa'i phyir / mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med
pa nyid du rnam par gzhag go // ngo bo nyid med pa 'di yang (D yang: P 'ang) dngos por na gzhan gyi dbang gi
ngo bo nyid kho na la rnam par gzhag ste [gzhan dbang] de kho na la [rtag mi rtag sogs] de'i mtshan nyid du
brtags pa'i phyir ro //. (The words in the square brackets [ ] are comments (mchan) inserted in the P edition.)
The imagined nature is regarded as the false convention (mithyåsaµv®ti), since ultimate intrinsic natures and
so forth are established by means of imagination. See BNG 22a1(307,1) and fn. 29. See also SDVK 8d: yang dag
min ni (SDVV min ni: SDVK ma yin) kun brtags yin //. “Just the imagined things are the false [convention].”
And see SDVV ad k. 8d D5b6-7: yang dag par skye ba la sogs pa gang yin pa de ni rtog pa'i bzos sbyar ba ste / de
ni yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun rdzob kyi bden pa'o //. “Real arising and so forth are constructed by means of
imagination, and they are the false conventional truth.”
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unliteral meaning, i.e., as meaning the lak≈añani˙svabhåvatå and parikalpitasvabhåva, then due
to its intentional meaning, conventional natures and conventional arising are not denied.
Therefore, that teaching can be understood as explaining the exclusion of the extreme of denial
(apavåda). It is said:
Moreover, [it is said in the Saµdhinirmocanasütra:]
Therefore, with the intention of the absence of nature concerning characters, I taught
that all dharmas did not arise.
In that [description] also, [the Illustrious One] denies understanding [the nonarising]
according to its literal meaning; establishing that the conventional dependent nature is
void of imagined natures as explained earlier, he also shows undeniable conventional
natures, and does not [show] ultimate [natures].33
Kamalaßîla's interpretation of the lak≈añani˙svabhåvatå shows the establishment of
dharmas' undeniable conventional dependent nature which is void of superimposed ultimate
intrinsic natures. Therefore, this also means that he accepts the establishment of both
defilement (saµkleßa) and purification (vyavadåna), because he holds that these two should be
established on the level of the conventional truth or correct convention (tathyasaµv®ti).34
33 MÅ D151a6-7: yang de lta bas na ngas mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid las dgongs nas chos thams cad
ma skyes pa'o (D pa'o: P pa'o //) zhes bshad do zhes gsungs pa gang yin pa der yang sgra ji bzhin gyi don du
yongs su rtog pa de sel bar yang mdzad la / gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid kun rdzob pa la ji skad bshad pa'i kun
brtags pa'i bdag nyid kyis dben pa sgrub cing skur ba mi 'debs pa'i kun rdzob kyi ngo bo yang ston pa yin gyi /
don dam pa nyid du ni ma yin no // .
SNS pp. 69, 33-70, 2: de'i phyir mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid la dgongs nas ngas chos thams cad ma
skyes pa / ... zhes bstan to /.
See MÅ D153a7-b1: gzhan gyi dbang kun rdzob tu skye ba'i phyir dang / de la brten nas sprul pas sprul pa
bzhin du rnam par rtog pa gzhan skye ba'i phyir de bas na / gzhan gyi dbang la brten nas su // mi rnams kyi ni
rnam rtog skye // zhes gsungs so // 'dis ni skur pa 'debs pa'i mtha' bsal ba yin te / kun rdzob pa'i skye ba la skur pa
mi 'debs pa'i phyir ro //. “Because the dependent [nature] arises conventionally and because in reliance upon the
[dependent nature], another* imagination arises just as it is magically created by a magically created being,
therefore it is said: ‘In reliance upon the dependent [nature], people's imaginations arise (LAS X k. 150cd).’ Due
to this, the extreme of denial (apavåda) is excluded. This is because one cannot deny the conventional arising.” [*
BNG 22b5(308,5): rtog pa gzhan dang gzhan “various imaginations.”]
34 See MÅ D156b2-3: chos rnams thams cad med pa'i phyir // (D //: P om.) zhes bya ba 'dis kyang dngos po
rnams kun rdzob tu yod pa nyid du brjod de / de dag ji ltar mthong bzhin min // (D //: P /) zhes 'byung ba'i phyir
ro // tha snyad kyi bden pa la brten nas kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / rnam par byang ba rnam par gzhag (D
gzhag: P bzhag) pa ni shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa las bstan pa'i phyir te /... //. “The [stanza] `because all
dharmas are nonexistent' (LAS X k. 137a: abhåvåt sarvadharmåñåµ) also says that entities are just existent
conventionally. This is because it is said: ‘those [dharmas] are not existent just as they are seen (X k. 137c: na ca
te tathå yathåd®≈†å˙).’ This is [also] because the establishments of defilement and purification in reliance upon the
conventional truth are explained in the Prajˆåpåramitå.” See also MÅ D161a6-7: de bas na yang dag par na gnyi
ga yang stong pa yin la / yang dag pa'i kun rdzob tu na (D na: P ni) gnyi ga yang gnas pa'i phyir kun nas nyon
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c. Paramårthani˙svabhåvatå
The thoroughly established nature (parini≈pannasvabhåva) means that from their own
natures (rang bzhin gyis), all dharmas do always not ultimately have any intrinsic natures. That
is, the thoroughly established nature should be understood as meaning that both dependent
nature and imagined nature are ultimately unestablished. This is because the absence of ultimate
intrinsic nature of all dharmas is established due to dharmas' being without any imagined or
superimposed ultimate natures and due to their dependent nature which lacks the superimposed
nature of ultimate arising and is ultimately unestablished.35
The thoroughly established nature is the ultimate (paramårtha), because it has the nature of
being established by means of valid cognition. The ultimate also consists in the absence of
intrinsic nature, because it is characterized (prabhåvita) by the absence of intrinsic nature.
Therefore, the thoroughly established nature is ultimately without intrinsic nature and is
regarded as the absence of nature concerning the ultimate.36
According to Kamalaßîla, when one understands the teaching of the ni˙svabhåvatå
according to its intentional unliteral meaning, i.e., as meaning the paramårthani˙svabhåvatå and
the parini≈pannasvabhåva, then that teaching can be understood as explaining the exclusion of
the extreme of superimposition (samåropa/åropa). This is because all dependent dharmas as
they are imagined do not ultimately arise and have no superimposed ultimate natures.37
When the paramårthani˙svabhåvatå is the meaning intended by the teaching of the
mongs pa dang (D dang: P dang /) rnam par byang ba'i phyogs med pa'i nyes pa yang ma yin te /. “Therefore,
both [defilement and purification] are really void, but on the level of the correct convention, both are existent.
Therefore, we do also not have the fault that the divisions of defilement and purification are nonexistent” And see
MÅ D152a3-4.
35 See fn. 36.
36 MÅ D151a1-2: chos thams cad don dam par rtag tu rang bzhin gyis ngo bo nyid med pa kho nar gnas pa gang
yin pa de ni yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid yin te / de ni rtag tu sgro btags pa med pa nyid du grub pa'i phyir ro //
de yang tshad mas yang dag par grub pa'i bdag nyid kyis don dam pa zhes kyang bya la ngo bo nyid med pas rab
tu phye ba'i phyir ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyang yin no // de'i phyir 'di ni don dam par ngo bo nyid med pa yin
no //. “The thoroughly established nature is established as following: from their own natures, all dharmas do
always not ultimately have any intrinsic nature at all. This is because the [thoroughly established nature] is
always established just as being without superimposed [ultimate natures]. The [thoroughly established nature] is
also termed `the ultimate' because it has the nature of being established by means of valid cognition: [the
ultimate] is characterized by the absence of intrinsic nature, and therefore [the ultimate] also consists in the
absence of intrinsic nature. Therefore, this [thoroughly established nature] is ultimately without intrinsic nature.”
A parallel passage is found in the MMA D1386-7, P167b1-2: gang yang chos thams cad don dam par rtag tu
rang bzhin gyis ngo bo nyid med par gnas pa de yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid de / (D de /: P de) [rang bzhin
med pa] de ni rtag tu sgro btags pa med pa nyid du grub pa'i phyir ro //. (The word in the square brackets [ ] is a
comment (mchan) inserted in the P edition.)
37 MÅ D153a6-7: don dam par gzhan gyi dbang ji ltar brtags pa bzhin ma skyes pa'i phyir brtags pa'i ngo bo
nyid kyis ma skyes pa nyid do // 'dis ni sgro 'dogs pa'i mtha' bsal ba yin no //. “The dependent [dharmas] as they
are imagined do not ultimately arise, and therefore no [dharmas] arise at all as having the imagined nature. Due to
this, the extreme of superimposition is excluded.” [* The words “no [dharmas] arise at all as having the imagined
nature” refer to the LAS X k. 150 ab: parikalpitaµ svabhåvena sarvadharmå ajånakå˙ //.]
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ni˙svabhåvatå, then due to this intended meaning, the Mådhyamikas accept the absence of
intrinsic nature as being the ultimate, and therefore the intended paramårthani˙svabhåvatå can
also be that teaching's definitive meaning (nîtårtha). Therefore, that teaching is regarded as
explaining the intentional and definitive meaning which expresses the paramårthani˙svabhåvatå.
He says:
Thus, it is said in the Saµdhinirmocana:
The [thoroughly established nature] is the ultimate and is also characterized by
the absence of intrinsic nature of dharmas, and therefore it is said that [the
thoroughly established nature] is without nature concerning the ultimate.
From the point of view of this absence of nature, all dharmas are just without intrinsic
nature. Therefore, the teaching of nonarising and so forth expresses the definitive
meaning (nîtårtha). Because the [nonarising and so forth] are taught with the intention
of the ultimate, those are also not contradictory with the empirical [objects] (d®≈†a-
virodha) and are also not literally understood. Therefore, it is not contradictory that a
teaching with an intentional meaning also expresses the definitive meaning.38
Thus, Kamalaßîla's interpretation of the three kinds of no-natures makes it possible for him
to hold that the ni˙svabhåvatå is a teaching to be understood according to the definitive
meaning and to invalidate the Yogåcåra idea that it would be a teaching to be understood
according to an interpretative meaning. Moreover, that interpretation of Kamalaßîla also enables
him to reply to the several objections that the Yogåcåras raised. That is, his interpretation serves
as the reason for saying that the Mådhyamikas will not have the twenty-eight wrong views
explained in the Mahåyånaprasådaprabhåvanasütra, because his interpretation shows that the
Mådhyamikas understand the ni˙svabhåvatå not according to the literal meaning but according
to an unliteral meaning, i.e., as meaning the three kinds of no-natures. His interpretation also
shows the middle way free of the two extremes of superimposition and denial and allows him to
say that the Mådhyamikas accept the establishment of both defilement (saµkleßa) and
38 MÅ D151b2-4: de skad du 'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa las / de ni don dam pa yang yin la / chos
rnams ngo bo nyid med pas rab tu phye ba yang yin pas de'i phyir don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa'o zhes bya'o
zhes gsungs te / gang gi phyir ngo bo nyid med pa 'dis chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa kho na yin pas de'i
phyir skye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa nges pa'i don yin no // de ni don dam pa la dgongs nas bstan pa'i phyir
mthong ba la sogs pa dang 'gal ba yang ma yin la / sgra ji bzhin du yongs su rtog pa yang ma yin no // de'i phyir
dgongs pa bstan pa yang nges pa'i don nyid du 'gal bar mi byed do //.
SNS p. 68, 30-32: de ni don dam pa yin la / don dam pa ni chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis
rab tu phye ba yin pas de'i phyir don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid zhes bya'o /.
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purification (vyavadåna), because they accept the establishment of the undeniable correct
conventional natures of dharmas.
5. Conclusion
Thus, Kamalaßîla, on the one hand, invalidates the Yogåcåra idea that one should
understand the teaching of the ni˙svabhåvatå according to an interpretative meaning, and, on
the other hand, accepts the Yogåcåra idea that the Illustrious One teaches the ni˙svabhåvatå
with the intention of explaining the three kinds of no-natures. Therefore, Kamalaßîla does not
completely reject the Yogåcåra ideas. Rather, showing that the Yogåcåra idea that the Illustrious
One teaches the ni˙svabhåvatå with the intention of three kinds of no-natures is compatible with
the Mådhyamika idea that the ni˙svabhåvatå is a teaching to be understood according to the
definitive meaning, he seems to undertake a reconciliation of the doctrinal conflict between the
two schools and harmonize the Yogåcåra philosophy with that of the Mådhyamika. Kamalaßîla
established this doctrinal compatibility or harmony by means of his interpretations of the
nîtårtha, neyårtha, three natures and three kinds of no-natures.
All these interpretations of Kamalaßîla are based upon Dharmakîrti's theory of valid
cognition and Kamalaßîla's vastubalaprav®ttånumånas. In order to justify his interpretations of
three kinds of no-natures and three natures, Kamalaßîla quotes many scriptures and treatises,
such as Någårjuna's Mülamadhyamakakårikå XV-1, 2ab, 8 and XXI-17ab. Kamalaßîla accepts
and quotes them as the statements which are not refuted by valid cognition, viz., Kamalaßîla's
vastubalaprav®ttånumånas which state five reasons, such as dependent origination (pratîtya-
samutpåda). Since Kamalaßîla's vastubalaprav®ttånumånas are also established on the basis of
Dharmakîrti's theory of valid cognition, it seems possible to say that that theory of Dharmakîrti
serves as the grounds for establishing all those interpretations of Kamalaßîla.
Kamalaßîla's accepting that theory of Dharmakîrti as his philosophical grounds makes it
possible for him to solve the doctrinal conflict between Mådhyamika and Yogåcåra.
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